The 2012 Olympic Learning Legacy Agenda -the intentionalities of mobility for a new

London model Introduction
Contemporary urban governance is a diversifying sub-disciplinary field of study, traversing urban geography and critical planning and urban development theory. As a recent article by McCann (2016) suggests, urban governance studies grapple with future problematics and emergent framings of what constitutes 'the good city' through relational understandings of state, market and civil society interactions and assemblages. Debates concerning the spatial reach of governmental framings of cities as 'models' is increasingly common, popularised through the policy mobilities discourse of the last decade. In cities around the world, the search for the next 'model' of governance and urban development is taking place, seeking the best 'fit' to bring economic efficiency, global or regional competitiveness and growth, along with cultural prosperity. This is not a new phenomenon, but the pace with which governance models 'travel' has risen along with the expansion of global private sector expertise in development and finance. Major events and large urban projects, like the Olympic Games, bring with them heightened attention to the institutionally-lubricated channels through which policy and governance ideas take hold. New forms of technocratic governance, become normalised through such projects and enable policy-makers and private development interests to claim the best model is one which succeeds in taking the politics out of development. This paper looks in detail at the London Olympic planning and development programme and uses the production and dissemination of the so-called Learning Legacy Agenda to try to better understand the preconditions of mobility underpinning the contention of an emergent new 'London Model.' In 2010, at the height of preparations for the London 2012 Olympic Games, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) launched its 'Learning Legacy Agenda' (LLA). The LLA was designed to act as the primary vehicle for the dissemination of best practices to professionals involved in other urban development programmes and major infrastructure projects elsewhere. The creation of the LLA represents a rare attempt to use the everyday practices and experiences of a specific urban project as a spring-board for the dissemination of development practices and models of governance, rather than a simple focus on placeboosterism. Most of the research to-date on the legacies of mega-events, like Olympic Games, explores their wider effects on urban development strategies, regeneration outcomes, and sporting/cultural activities (e.g. Girginov and Hills, 2008; MacRury, 2009 Poynter et al, 2012; Smith et al., 2011) . Much less has been written on their broader implications for governance and the contingent intentionalities of those involved to capture and circulate the knowledge(s) that they have acquired through their experiences of project management and delivery in a specific context. This paper interrogates the production of the LLA, considering both the changing intentionalities associated with its pre-and post-Games dissemination and the role of so-called 'middling technocrats' (Larner and Laurie, 2010) in the fixing of particular forms of knowledge. Intentionalities, are here understood in a phenomenological sense as the unconscious 'directedness' or 'aboutness' of learning from given experiences and indirect inference-making on the basis of such experiences (Glendinning, 2007, p.37) . This is different than 'intentions' which are understood to be more deliberate or conscious aims that guide considered action. Our focus on the LLA allows us to unpack the emergence of a potentially mobile governance 'narrative' or 'agreed story' (Bevir, 2013) , sometimes referred to in our research as a new model, a term which suggests a formal abstraction, rather than our preferred perspective as an assemblage of contingent activities. More specifically, the paper will unpack the production of a potentially-mobile governance 'model' in relation to its city of origin, London, the social relations and networks constituting its emergence, and the diverse and coevolving intentionalities for wider consumption and adaptation of the agenda presumed by its initiators (the ODA) and its dissemination partners and actualised by and for an extended audience of onlookers and would-be adopters. In the process, we emphasise the importance of small 'p' politics or the myriad of mundane practices "often regarded as less important than larger institutionalised processes" (McCann and Ward, 2013, p. 10) and how these intersect with institutional discourses and logics circulating within and between agencies, organisations and individuals.
In this analysis, we will draw on a broadly topological perspective (Allen, 2011; Allen and Cochrane, 2010; Allen and Cochrane, 2014) , wherein the contemporary spatiality of the state is defined by the practices of a myriad of governmental actors drawn within its authoritative, rather than territorial, reach. This of course is not new to the study of governance, but the topological lens is infrequently operationalized in the study of travelling ideas and mobilisation of 'models'. Such a lens allows us to investigate the confluence of these myriad practices and dialogics, culminating in the production of governance models, such as those found in the LLA and its promotion of a management and delivery-focussed model of governance that simultaneously celebrates the successes of elite groups of experts and consultancies to lead and manage delivery, whilst establishing (but rhetorically downplaying) the close dependence of these agents on state power, regulations and spending. We place critical focus not on the reification of centralised institutions as much as on the 'decentring' of governance practices understood as "contingent patterns of action occurring in specific contexts" (Bevir, 2013, p. 5) .
A topological perspective addresses Roy's (2012) assertion of the need to deuniversalise the mobility of the governance narrative from the practices which continue to mobilise it. Our study is based on an ethnographic investigation of the LLA process and outputs, combining a discursive analysis of publicly accessible materials with 13 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with key LLA actors, focusing on the "more private stories" (Larner and Laurie, 2010, p. 220) and reflections on the project and its mobility. These were triangulated through an in-depth and systematic analysis of the materials and texts produced by the ODA and follow-up interviews with those who have sought to 'use' the London Olympic model to promote wider objectives and ambitions. It should be stated however that our focus was on the intentionalities of the governance narrative or model, the so-called pre-conditions to mobility (Huxley, 2013) , and less on an empirical verification of whether or not 'real learning' was taking place as the model was in-full, in-part, or in rhetoric alone, adopted. This will be returned to in the next section.
The next section will discuss some of the broader literature on policy mobilities and topologies to situate the case study. The paper then turns to the case study and begins by providing an overview of the LLA, setting out its inception, coordination, and implementation.
We then explore the intentionalities of mobility that underpinned its formation and dissemination. Consideration is given to the national and international promotion and take-up of the governance narrative, as well as an exploration of the range of ways the LLA banner is and has been used by different actors and organisations to support their own agendas. In so doing, the significance of the validation of existing practices amongst LLA producers, dissemination partners and their associated networks is highlighted.
Governance Topologies and the Circulation of Development Models
The literature on urban politics has become increasingly concerned with the mobility of knowledges and the mobilisation of particular visions of how 'to do' urban policy. As Cochrane and Ward (2012) argue, such research examines the ways in which tensions between different agencies and interests are worked through in particular contexts to create and produce policies in place, which are then mobilised and converted into a series of wider blueprints and frameworks. The bigger question is therefore not whether a specific project, such as the Olympic Park, was a 'success' but how that success is produced and re-produced through the actions of agents and institutions (Peck and Theodore, 2010) . As will be argued, the dissemination of the LLA was by and large orchestrated by a range of interests with the preconditions of mobility inscribed within institutionally-specific channels and networks.
These processes of knowledge transfer represent what Roy (2012) terms ethnographic circulations, or the interaction between those with 'embodied knowledge' who develop and implement policy programmes and blueprints for cities. For Roy, it is imperative that researchers understand the form and character of these "ethnographic circulations that entail much more than a shift from an ethnography of locations to an ethnography of circulations" (2012, p. 34 ). This requires a shift 'from a study of mobile policy to the study of the practices through which policy is made mobile or how a parochial idea, rooted in time and place is rendered universal or at least transnational' or greater attention paid to the ways in which policies are assembled together. They are often given enhanced legitimacy because of who has been involved. It is increasingly common for mobile policy models to entangle commercial interests of private companies and arms-length, non-governmental and lobbyist organisations with institutional objectives, priorities and favoured industry alignments.
These assemblages of actors draw on a variety of sources of power and knowledge.
Thinking topologically, models appear through non-linear processes mediated through realtime connections "wherein the pervasive quality of the state's authority is inseparable from the social relationships that comprise it" (Allen and Cochrane, 2010, p. 1074) . Such 'models' or other circulating abstract ideas are the product of expert networks and communities of practice (Clarke, 2012) co-constituted by the practices of situated interpretative communities (Lee and LiPuma, 2002) . This, Allen and Cochrane (2010) suggest, marks not a re-scaling or redistribution of institutional hierarchies but the re-assemblage of state hierarchical powers in terms of spatial reach. "Power and authority...are not so much seeping away from the corridors or Whitehall as being subject to renegotiation and displacement by the political actors drawn within reach" (p.1074).
Thus, to understand production and circulation of a model requires the deuniversalisation of its composition and following. As Peck and Theodore (2010) argue, models are not models without followers and a model can only enrol followers if it holds the promise of "extra-local salience" (p. 171). They suggest that some models achieve mobility because they have 'in some way or another been ideologically anointed or sanctioned' (Ibid), perhaps by coming from the 'right place' they invoke certain associations of best practice. Dominant models can therefore be interpreted as "creature[s] of dominant interests, travelling from centres of authority along politically constructed and ideologically lubricated channels" (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p. 170) . Increasingly however, the 'centres of authority' are not government departments and agencies but the complex assemblage of firms, consultancies, agencies and organisations that constitute a decentralized governance field who have refined and aligned their agendas into development models and best practices ready-packaged as functional universals and re-circulated narratives of success through their own national and international networks.
Methodologically speaking, the exploration of model formation thus requires an investigation of the social and institutional relations through which such narratives are assembled and converted into transferable simplifications. Those responsible for providing the template to 'repeat the trick' are those 'middling technocrats' (Larner and Laurie, 2010; Roy, 2012) who possess the embodied knowledge to develop and implement governmental programmes and systems in cities like London. Roy (2012) suggests that the social practices of these (increasingly transient) practitioners and bureaucrats constitute the ethnographic circulations that should be prioritised in any attempt to study the mobility of models and narratives of best practice. The emphasis, she argues, need not be on the mobile policy or programme, but on the practices through which these are made mobile. The formation of so called 'best practice' must be viewed as a governmental technology or instrument that promotes aligned political rationalities and supports their translation and mobility (Bulkeley 2006; Moore 2013 ).
In many cities, there is what Healey (2007) terms an increasingly 'restless search' to identify forms of governance and development that will help to produce enhanced economic growth. Cities are under intense pressure to boost their competitiveness and this has led to a greater interest in the capacity of different governance models to enable growth to flourish and to demonstrate that state powers and regulations are being used in a more efficient and effective manner. There is a growing emphasis on the creation of iconic places where development has 'happened', with examples of Barcelona, Baltimore and Vancouver endemic to the illustration of how approaches to urban problems and development programmes get reduced to stylized one-dimensional models that get 'moved' by governance actors -thus taking on the characteristics of "reified avatars" (McCann and Ward, 2012, p. 47) .
One can therefore question or probe the networks between the sites of knowledge production, capture and adaptation and the presumed overlapping ideological orientations and congruent political projects (Peck and Theodore, 2010) . This might involve taking up McCann's (2013) challenge of linking the study of the extra-local projection of models with boosterism through detailed investigation of supply-side (success stories propagated by those with an interest in marketing the approach) and demand-side (the motivations and conditions of those who are receptive to models and approaches from elsewhere).
Concomitantly, the search for new governance models has co-evolved with the rise of global private sector expertise and the increasing power and influence of multi-national corporations that promote and provide templates of good governance. Some, including the socalled 'Big 4' (Ernst&Young, PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Deloitte, KPMG) have set out clear blueprints for the 'good governance' of cities, based on the principles established by global bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank (Raco, 2014) . At the same time, global firms working in the sectors of engineering, project management and construction have also become key players and in some instances the same actors may even move from project to project taking their knowledge of what governance arrangements 'work best' with them. The growing congruence between the emergence of these actors and the increasing appetite for cities to consume or follow iconic templates of success is codifying and institutionalising new forms of technocratic governance, in which, as Putnam (1976) noted, 'technics must replace politics' and political conflict. Efficient and effective models of how to govern, manage, and deliver urban projects are mobilised to enable policy-makers and experts to pre-empt and manage the messiness associated with place-based conditions, disruptions and potentials for conflict.
In the remainder of the paper we now turn to the case of the London Olympics and the emergence of the LLA as a specific institutionalised governance and development model to analyse the impact of specific forms of social relations on the ways in which models are produced, what their content consists of, how dominant agendas and narratives co-evolve with the priorities of an assemblage of actors, and the processes of selective abstraction used to curate particular messages and forms of knowledge. The extent to which 'learning' has actually occurred is less transparent in the analysis. To know who is 'learning' and what practices have changed in the industry because of the collation of the LLA would need to involve a more detailed ethnographic investigation of knowledge construction, translation and dissemination practices in the complex contractual terrain of construction and development supply chains, both domestically and internationally. As will be noted later, those involved in co-producing the LLA were not very pro-active in monitoring its reach to enable us to infer the extent to which real sector-based 'learning', in the sense of meaning creation, identity and community (re)construction, and practice-based change (Wenger, 1998) , was taking place. 'Learning' in the original framing of the LLA was limited to capturing existing knowledge and the validation of this as best practice; it was not about innovation and the promotion of deep learning. The output was primarily the presentation of an online repository, supported by some dissemination events to inform rather than engage in a participatory sense the target audience of professionals.
Ultimately, the original goal of the LLA 'project' was to gather technical knowledge and curate it for inter-referencing purposes as a toolkit of tried-and-tested approaches. Dissemination and 'learning', at the outset was of less importance than minimizing the net loss of existing knowledge from such a one-off large urban development project. Whilst this might have been the ODA's original aim, this was not the motivation of many of the dissemination partners as will be seen through the discussion of co-evolving intentionalities.
A Learning Legacy Agenda
The LLA was originally an attempt by individuals and units within the ODA to document the work that had been carried out on the Olympic sites and the wider lessons for policy-makers, recommending that the ODA would be well-placed to lead in identifying lessons from the Games' 'flagship programme' for other construction projects, the LLA initiative was unlike anything developed by any previous hosts of the Games. It was not driven by the International Olympic Committee, who have an operationally-focussed learning programme between host cities but do not require any knowledge from the delivery experience to be made publicly available. Indeed, there was no legal or contractual obligation to produce a LLA and at the time there was little demand-side incentive to accumulate knowledge or narratives of good (or bad) practice other than the nudge in the Select Committee report.
The ODA took on the co-ordinating role and acted, in the words of one manager, "more like a consultation [service] , consulting the industry for what lessons learned they were interested in hearing". It established relationships and dialogues with professional bodies in key sectors; particularly those involved in engineering and construction. Initially, the LLA received no core funding and was facilitated on a voluntary basis by those managing different aspects of the development (the 'theme leaders') and others, including academics, who were asked to provide briefing papers and project overviews. Gradually, bodies such as the Institute for Civil Engineers [ICE] and the Health and Safety Executive [HSE] supported specific outputs that were seen as particularly relevant to their members and future regeneration activities. The ODA contributed 40% of the costs itself. Through these consultations, the ODA sought to identify both core process-outcomes, through 'lessons learned', and more tangible objects of intervention that became known as 'Champion Products'. Most importantly, there was an attempt to give legitimacy to the wider Olympic project within London that was generating growing criticism, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis. The ODA developed a clear governance narrative that the Games were delivered on time (a big build construction programme delivered a year ahead of the Games), that they were delivered on budget (against the anticipated £6.8bn cost), that they were fit for purpose (designed for legacy as well as the Games themselves) and that the achievements in all the priority theme areas were above industry benchmarks .
The scope, form and content of the LLA were determined internally by the ODA-appointed project manager. As part of the scoping exercise, ODA staff were asked to consider the following prompts:
 What did we do that was innovative?
 Could it be replicated on future projects and programmes?
 What did we do badly and what would we do differently on the next project?
 Is there an audience for these lessons learned?
 What industry experts/representatives can we partner with to help collate the lessons learned and/or support the dissemination?
 Who can validate the findings as best practice? .
Instigators of the LLA within ODA intended to capture 'lessons learned' before people moved on to other projects so that there was no loss of intellectual capital. The scoping exercise, informed by consultation with industry, professional and academic partners, led to the decision to produce material relating to 10 priority themes. 1
Over 250 documents were produced in late 2010 and early 2011 in a variety of different formats and lengths (Table 1 ). The production process reflected the wider delivery of the Olympics, with the ODA providing a framework and the co-ordination but much of the work and authorship of these documents was conducted by private sector practitioners working for the delivery partner, CLM, or its numerous contractors such as Atkins, Arup, Balfour Beatty and KLH Sustainability. The research papers were authored by professional bodies and partners from academia, who were also involved in peer reviewing the documents produced.
In total, our content analysis identified 93 staff from different organisations involved in the authorship of the LLA materials. Figure 1 illustrates the organisations employing practitioners producing the most documents, and the interconnections between the documents relating to the different priority themes, giving a sense of how the production of the LLA was a complex institutional assemblage. The documents were written with a primary audience of practitioners working in similar fields, and are essentially a set of 'how to' instructions in various formats.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Following peer review, the documents were published online on a dedicated website in October 2011. The website was called a 'goldmine of knowledge' in a UK Cabinet Office report (UK Government, 2012) and was transferred to be hosted by the Cabinet Office to ensure its continued existence after the ODA's demise. By September 2012 the website had already been viewed by over 43,000 people, 35% of whom were from overseas (UK Government, 2012) . The most popular themes were environment and sustainability, followed by health and safety, project and programme management and design and engineering. Although most of the documents were produced pre-Games, following the perceived success of the Games, further documents were added to the LLA website, which grew to over 400 documents by 2013 (UK Government, 2013) .
As well as publishing the documents, the LLA's dissemination strategy also involved the hosting of a series of events by eleven dissemination partner agencies (See Table 2 ) related to professional and regulatory benchmarks in key standards (particularly around engineering and construction) with whom the ODA had established relationships and dialogues. The ODA were keen to involve a range of partners to ensure better dissemination of the material; as one ODA official told us, We as the ODA are not trying to tell anybody anything. We are the client, it was our budget, our money, we led the project but these are written by a whole raft of organisations…".
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
These events comprised over 150 key actors from the range of organisations and contractors responsible for delivering the Games being designated as 'Learning Legacy Ambassadors' and then delivering a series of over 50 seminars, workshops and master classes with the partner organisations throughout 2012 across the UK, which were attended by over 4,000 people. A number of follow-up events were then arranged internationally by UKTI and the British Council in 2012 and 2013. These events were aimed at actors involved in similar roles for other projects or organisations who will be interested in the embodied knowledge and experience of the 'ambassadors'. They were thus meetings of 'middling technocrats' where a physical co-presence allowed the development of common understandings about the best way to approach particular problems and promote policy mobility (Stone, 2004) . However, it is also important to note that surprisingly few resources went into monitoring the impact of the LLA portal and events, so there is little evidence to support claims of 'success' as a legacy for UK-based construction and development projects. Who exactly the 'learning' was aimed at was also unclear, as the events often engaged the existing networks of the dissemination partners, showcasing current rather than innovative practice.
In the remaining sections, we focus on the complex intentionalities of the assemblages of different actors and agencies involved in the production of the LLA, before turning to the evolution of an iconic London model and the processes involved in fixing and mobilising specific forms of selective knowledge.
Intentionalities and Social Relations of Model Formation
In the discussion above we have highlighted some of the formal objectives, priorities, and structures of the LLA. In our research, we uncovered a number of intersecting intentionalities that evolved into the formal LLA. For those involved in setting up the LLA first, and foremost, it was presented as a means of capturing knowledge and experience in a way that would be accessible to regeneration professionals and policy-makers elsewhere. Development projects are, by their nature, carried out in a compartmentalised and fragmented way with experts moving from one project to the next and spending relatively little time reflecting on their actions (see Bentley and Rafferty, 1992) . For some within the ODA, the LLA could therefore be used to showcase some of the 'successful' practice-based activities and management structures that underpinned the Olympic programme. In the words of one ODA official, with an engineering and project-management background, the LLA had been prompted by the observation that, people typically come and go and projects lose all their intellectual capital…it remains in the heads of those involved but they move on to another project. Rarely are they formally captured in a meaningful way.
A core objective for the LLA was therefore to "try and write down some of the things we've done, loosely around some priority themes" (Interview ODA Senior Manager). It was not originally designed to form the basis of a model or a wider political agenda to transfer neoliberal practices to other contexts.
As one ODA official commented, the spreading of 'best practice' was a vital goal for the LLA: This was very much presented in terms of technical expertise and the chance for those involved in the particular tasks of delivering the Olympics to then share these experiences with other actors involved in similar fields in other projects.
Those involved with the LLA were keen to emphasize that the Games had been delivered using the best of "proven existing tools and knowledge" rather than acting as a particular forum for innovation for actors working at all scales of development, not only megaprojects. ODA respondents frequently used the term 'leading edge, not bleeding edge' to make this point in relation to its own activities. Its focus on delivery meant that it had relatively little scope for major innovations that might fail, so that according to one private sector project manager from an LLA dissemination partner, this made it, This absence of innovation, paradoxically, made the idea of creating a transferable set of ideas easier as it meant that there were relatively simple lessons that others could take away. But the actual take-up and influence of these 'lessons' was not monitored closely by most of the dissemination partners, rather it seemed of secondary importance to capturing and documenting existing 'good' practice. The intention was specifically to showcase practices and the impacts that experts could and more accurately, do already, make on urban development projects when provided with the right types of governance arrangements and resources.
A second rationale was that for some respondents the creation of the LLA was presented as a public duty. The Games was the biggest single area-based urban intervention in the history of British urban policy, with an eventual spend in-excess-of over £9billion. ODA actors, in interview, argued that they had a moral and ethical obligation to expla in how the money had been spent and the management practices that underpinned the development. The voluntary nature of much of the original work meant that for many of those involved, the LLA proved to be something of a burden that was undertaken as a public duty, with one ODA Planning staffer stating the LLA was "the bane of [his] The whole programme, it was claimed, was non-ideological and non-political. It was to be a "pick list of information, approaches, techniques, the thinking that went on behind it, outcomes, results" (Interview, ODA Senior Official). It was founded on the principles of a realistic politics that promised to deliver manageable and tangible outcomes, untainted by significant political interference or ideologies. The role of the assemblage of state bodies involved in the governance of the project was to keep political interference to a minimum and to use state power to reach out and enforce the agreements it had made to deliver the project. The extent to which this is the case was demonstrated in 2013 when Sir John Armitt, former Chair of the ODA, was commissioned by the Labour Party to produce a review on how to improve future infrastructure delivery in the UK. This report recommended adoption of the Olympic delivery partner model to 'take the politics out of infrastructure' (Armitt, 2013) .
A third set of intentionalities also became clear in our interviews and these have become increasingly significant and powerful. There has been an attempt to establish and build on the extra-local salience of the LLA and use the Olympics as a platform from which to establish broader economic and political messages. The LLA thus became embedded in a broader political project; the desire to curate an international model that would showcase 'UK plc' as an assemblage of public and private actors working as a coherent entity and in competition with other national economies. As noted above, this theme is now mentioned repeatedly on the LLA website and forms part of its core mission statement. This is illustrative of the considerable fluidity around the audience of the LLA and reasons for actor involvement over time. The growing focus on UK plc on the international stage was in the words of one ODA manager an "added benefit, not intentional". The UK Government itself wasted little time in organising the 'GREAT Britain' international marketing campaign to champion the success of the Games and profile the capabilities of UK plc to attract inward investment in UK-based development projects and to encourage UK success in securing high-value international contracts abroad. In 2012 UKTI set a target to use the Games to generate £11 billion of trade and investment for the UK by 2016. Proclaiming by July 2013 that £9.9 billion of economic benefits, 90% of the four-year target had been attained in just one year. £1.5 billion of this was attributed to Olympic-related high-value opportunities won overseas in particular for work on other major sporting projects, such as Sochi 2014 and Rio 2016 (HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013). Central Government's promotion of the LLA's 'lessons learned' platform, and eventually a brand, in order for UK plc to be vaulted into a leadership role on the international development stage sits in rather stark contrast to the humble (domestic) aims proclaimed by the LLA originators.
It is a message that has been taken up with vigour by the UKTI. Its clear intention has been to use the LLA to promote British firms and the UK's modernised 'pro-business' approach to planning. As one UKTI senior manager recalled,
the key message is that the Games were delivered on time and on budget. That's the message we push…and that helps companies associated with realising that…The 2012 contractors should be selling themselves on the basis of their fantastic project delivery for the Games. They can articulate their involvement and it will help them tell their story.
British Embassies and trade delegations around the world now use the LLA as a springboard for marketing campaigns to attract foreign direct investment and to encourage public bodies in cities across the world to adopt a London Model of development, along with the private firms who 'made it happen'. The LLA has enabled UKTI to "bust a number of persistent myths about London and the UK, for example that our public transport system is poor", whilst simultaneously acting as "a big networking event for corporates" (Interview, UKTI Senior Manager). It is seen as enhancing the reputational capital of UK firms, even though many of those involved in the delivery of the Games were not UK-based.
Yet it is not just the UK Government's promotion of the LLA which has evolved beyond the original intentionalities of the LLA. A number of institutions, in both the public and private sectors have used the LLA as a platform for greater recognition and association.
Both public and private actors wanted to demonstrate just how effective their practices had been and sought to use the example of the Games to support wider agendas. For private companies, any Olympic-based activities are subject to the IOC's complex rules on sponsorship and official branding that preclude non-official sponsors from benefitting directly from Games marketing. Many firms interviewed for this research expressed their frustration with these restrictions as they prevented them from openly marketing their activities and Olympic 'successes' to potential clients elsewhere. In the words of one Olympics-contracted construction firm director,
the massive frustration for me and a lot of people that we seem to have impressed with the Olympics, was that there were all these Olympic rules around on 'no marketing' and we had to sign up to that and say that we weren't to mention what we'd done on the project.
For the ODA, the LLA therefore opened up what one senior official referred to as,
a way of allowing some kudos, because of the benefits that have arisen out of the success. They have their name and company on the LLA documents and this was one reason we got them involved in the first place.
In this manner, the LLA acted as a springboard for private companies to market their activities and to demonstrate that they have the capacity to deliver and manage urban projects of this size and scale.
From the research interviews, it is clear there was much to be gained for those agencies that could demonstrate that their activities had (or will) contribute to the imagined competitiveness of the 'UK economy' (the shorthand term 'UK Plc' was widely invoked) and the private sector, and the LLA provided a high-profile platform to do so. The HSE, for example, was heavily involved in all stages of the Olympics and saw the LLA as an opportunity to demonstrate how effective its actions have been. The Coalition government had made it clear that it saw 'unnecessary' Health and Safety regulations as a brake on development and the HSE, more broadly, had been subject to repeated public attacks on its legitimacy, particularly from business interests (see O'Neil, 2013) . The Olympics provided a high-profile opportunity for the HSE to show that regulations could be used to promote both enhanced safety and profitability. Its executives pointed to the management processes through which regulations were negotiated and enforced, and the monitoring schemes it established, as examples of best practice that should be rolled-out to construction projects across the UK and beyond. It also highlighted the fact that there were no fatalities in the construction of the Olympic sites; a real achievement for a construction project of this size and scale. The HSE has therefore used the LLA to stress that it should now be involved directly in development projects elsewhere. It has embraced the LLA and funded some of its outputs. It sees the LLA as a platform for the building of a transferable model of regulation.
Other public bodies have also taken the opportunity offered by the LLA to draw attention to the alignments that exist between their practices and the 'reformist' agendas of central government. For instance, a variety of bodies have sought to demonstrate how their involvement in the delivery of the Olympics reflects the UK government's objective of encouraging widespread privatisation and private-led urban project management. Those public bodies able to demonstrate their ability to forge close working relationships with dynamic and successful private sector companies believe that they will enhance their credibility with policymakers. The LLA thus gives legitimacy to those calling for more hybrid forms of policymaking and more entrepreneurial modes of governance. In the post-Games period interviewees reported that the economic 'dividends' that resulted from the Games have taken on a greater prominence and that public and private organisations were taking the opportunity to use the Games as a showcase for how their own activities and sources of expertise had economic value.
This has been reflected in subsequent formal government evaluations of the benefits of the Games that present the success of British companies in acquiring development contracts elsewhere through the LLA, as a form of legacy benefit (see HM Government and Mayor of London, 2013) . Whilst the language of the LLA is that of best practice and wider learning, some private companies have found it an important avenue through which to promote their own activities. This was partly because, in the words of contracted construction firm representative, "being a very publicly focused project the world was looking at us and we were to keep our noses clean and be whiter than white". But it was also partly because firms and individuals within them felt that they had innovative and successful practices that they wanted to promote. The LLA provided the apparatus through which this good practice, based on the activities of an elite group of private developers, could be converted into effective forms of public-private working and new governance frameworks. As one senior ODA official suggested, the LLA documents and events provided the potential for economic dividends and improved reputations "because of the benefits that have arisen out of the success", with companies and indeed specific individuals having their names on LLA documents. Similarly, another ODA official noted that,
[the LLA] does a number of things … it does a lot for their own personal and career development, being able to stand up and talk about things and share their experiences.
It promotes the company in a good light. It throws what the UK has done in a good light as well. So, there are lots of reasons to do it.
This focus on the individual actor is important in charting the evolution of the LLA's utilisation, and accords with Larner and Laurie's (2010) concern with the role of the 'middling technocrat' in the dissemination of new practices associated with economic globalisation.
For other public bodies, there was also a perceived political dividend in demonstrating that their activities had had a positive impact on the quality of the Olympic development and the success of the master planning process. The broad assemblage of those involved in the LLA meant that NGOs were also provided with a platform to promote their own activities and The core target audiences according to the same interviewee were, the design and construction industry. So we were trying to write the papers so that they would be read by the industry and we had some notions for them to
consider….our main aim is to try and change an industry which is regarded as backwards in terms of this agenda.
However, another senior director within the ODA provided a contradictory take on the target audience and the aims of the LLA acting as a "library of reference" for the future use of the target audience:
the target audience were public and private clients in development and regeneration, professionals (designers, architects, engineers, contractors) and academia. Not all the construction industry…We had no philosophical or expected outcomes in terms of how we are going to change the world.
A key component of these wider changes was the mobilisation of the UKGBC to act as conduit for the ODA's sustainability models. As the same respondent noted, we needed to go through another organisation… [as] we wanted a body that could continue to hold our papers and make them available and also we wanted a body where actually there was a link to what we were doing and to trade associations which are associated with sustainable construction and standardised construction agendas.
The UKGBC was selected to run a series of events and workshops as part of the LLA and to promote the ODA's sustainability programmes. The emphasis has been on how to bring sustainability requirements into contract and procurement practices; the monitoring of outcomes; and key points of intervention in project life-cycles. For the UKGBC the LLA opened up new opportunities to promote its own activities and the LLA has been absorbed and adapted to meet its own agendas and needs.
The same is true for other NGO bodies. Educational and industry trusts such as the IET were "very keen to get the Olympic message across" right from the outset. The organisation was taken on by the ODA as an official partner and the LLA Partner for Transport. Its core function was to disseminate knowledge, best practices, and lessons learned from the Games.
But the IET has a wider educational remit to promote engineering knowledge amongst nonengineers and to work with schools and others to encourage more young people to go into engineering professions. The open nature of the ODA's LLA meant that it became an opportunity space for these different interests with very diverse intentions. As one private sector dissemination partner representative noted in interview,
From my perspective, there wasn't a well-developed strategy for LLA within the ODA…which was helpful, it was a probe in that sense, because it meant that wherever
we had the opportunity we were almost guiding and steering the ODA into how they should do it. It was not top down.
In this section, the intentionalities of those involved in producing and disseminatin g the LLA have been unpacked. One set of intentionalities focused on the national scale and one on the international. Both compel closer examination of the nexus of rationalities assembling as sites of knowledge production, capture, adaptation and circulation (Peck and Theodore 2010) . In the final section, we explore the pre-conditions for mobility (Huxley 2013 ) inscribed within institutionally-lubricated channels that have enabled the LLA to take on the characteristics of a new 'London model'.
From a Learning Legacy Agenda to a Transferable London Model?
The original objectives of the LLA have evolved and gradually become enmeshed in the wider politics and practices of contemporary, post-recession governance. The LLA has increasingly become the basic checklist for a model of how 'to do' development based on the principles of contract-led project management and sustainability planning. In the words of a key LLA director, the approach to sustainable urban development enshrined in the Olympics project came to constitute,
a London model. That is, set up your policy and strategy on day one, drive it through with measurable targets, embed it into design and construction, incentivise people in terms of reputations and personal ethos and professionalism to drive them through, look at innovative ways of delivering against them, measure them vigorously and publish those regularly…this is a London model.
The model seeks to build on the LLA's work to improve the competitiveness of the UK construction industry and to turn British firms into world leaders in urban regeneration. The LLA was originally perceived as a domestic demonstration of how applying principles of good practice regardless of project scale and location could be done within the existing tools available to producers. In other words, it was the best of the ordinary rather than the exceptional or extraordinary that were being showcased in order to demonstrate the potential for improvement across the domestic construction and development industry and to bring standards up across the sector. So, the original intentionality of the LLA was an attempt by middling technocrats within the ODA to document the work that had been carried out on the Olympic sites and the wider lessons for policy-makers, developers, and other technical experts working on projects elsewhere, mainly in the UK and within the private sector. The UK Government made it clear that through the LLA 'the ODA has provided a model for success that is transferable to other UK construction projects' (Morrell in Elson, 2013, online) . Yet, in the words of one private sector dissemination partner representative "for big projects you need big people involved" and multinational firms have been more than happy to promote this message. The LLA has therefore created a model that lends itself to more elitist forms of project management as only multinational firms have the capacity to 'deliver' on new regulatory requirements and the push for 'quality' urban development. Some interviewees in the construction sector, for instance, welcomed the introduction of enhanced regulations over H&S requirements and environmental sourcing of materials as, in effect, this limited the opportunities for smaller firms to take a leading role in future projects. It was felt this would increase quality as "there are no cowboys 2 amongst the big boys" (Interview, LLA Dissemination Partner). Similarly, there was a call for government to use the London Model and the LLA to mandate certain types of contracts to be used for all public-sector infrastructure projects.
In the case of the LLA and the London Olympics more generally, a new governance narrative is therefore being proposed that represents both a reformed governance system and the introduction of new technologies of governance. The LLA follows the increasing tendency for development models or approaches to be concerned with setting out clear 'how to' instructions for practitioners within and beyond the immediate context in which they emerged.
Despite a clear boundedness to the contextual origins of such approaches with territories of action identified and targeted for special attention, the broader circumstances within which these practices arise and how these support, or threaten the coherence of best practices and models is deliberately downplayed and relegated to that of a series of 'defects' or 'barriers' that should be isolated from the real business of 'getting things done'.
For many interviewees, the delivery of the Olympics exemplified what can be done if state bodies are delivery-focussed and staffed by private experts, and was often compared favourably with perceived 'failed' major development projects of the past which had been delivered or project managed directly by the public sector and where costs had escalated. As a representative from a private construction firm suggested, the contractual arrangements between the private delivery partner [CLM] and the ODA were at the heart of the 'success': It was suggested that London 2012 had succeeded specifically because the 'politics were taken out of it' (Armitt, 2013) . The ODA's relatively passive approach to knowledge capture and the production of a model was essentially based on utilising a range of public and private actors promoting their own particular interests converted into a series of governance blue prints that could be used to shape the politics and practices of development elsewhere. This 'London model' therefore emphasises the importance of strong, dedicated delivery institutions, a high degree of interchange between the public and private sectors, strategy established very early on and then driven through measurable targets 'on the ground', the use of contractual obligations to achieve objectives and incentivized management of the development process. It is a model focussed on the conversion of messy places into manageable and deliverable development spaces. The London Games represented a new model of state-led privatization in which public funds and objectives have been converted into privately run and contractually delivered programmes of action, but it is dangerous to tag the London delivery of this one-off event as exceptional. As Raco (2012) has argued, the London Olympics was not a 'game changer' in terms of politics but part of a longer-term emergence of a form of regulatory capitalism "under which hybrid relationships emerge between states and powerful corporations, to the point that the distinctions between providers and policymakers become increasingly blurred" (p.452).
These regime changes are not specific to London, but the London Games have presented perhaps the clearest demonstration of the emergent 'what matters is what works' approach to the governance of development. The reputational capital of the success of such an approach in London is undeniable in the inevitable 'travel' of a so-called 'London model' to other cities around the world. The Olympics can therefore be viewed as a "politicized opportunity for intervention" (Peck, 2011, p. 778 ) that provided the platform to enact a preferred strategy of privatization and embed normatively pre-figured 'lessons' for other projects within the technically camouflaged political exercise of the LLA.
The essentialism of 'London' to the model produced in part by the apparatus (Roy, 2012 ) of the LLA is questionable. One might argue that the LLA process was the original collation of a yet-to-be valorised through emulation governance model that emerged within place-and-time-specific and politically contingent conditions linked to the Olympic Park construction project. Post-Games, however, the 'London 2012' moniker became a "badge of pride" (Cochrane and Ward, 2012, p. 9 ) to justify claims of success and marketing to promote its emulation and repetition in other contexts. It has taken on greater significance in the wake of UK government efforts to promote greater competitiveness within the British economy and London's longer reputation as a city in which it is particularly difficult to get major infrastructure projects completed (see HM Treasury, 2015) .
Conclusions
The paper has drawn on the example of the London Olympics and the production of an institutionalised Learning Legacy Agenda to explore the relationships between urban development practices, knowledge production, and the creation and dissemination of wideranging governance models. It contributes to the burgeoning literature on policy mobilities and circulations by documenting the specific types of knowledge that have been produced in a high-profile case study, the social and institutional relations that underpinned the process, and the work that models and selective knowledge captures are put to. The examination of the local and extra-local intentionalities of mobility outlined in this paper suggests that models for urban development practice have morphed into larger scale governmental blueprints. Projects are not seen in isolation but as a part of a broader set of agendas that set in place specific and bounded forms of praxis. We have documented how a new 'London model' of development and governance has co-emerged along with the national and international narratives of 'success' associated with the planning and delivery of the 2012 Olympic project. The model is designed to be both place-centred, in its explicit relation to London, and simultaneously generic and possessing much wider applicability to 'urban' contexts across the world. The explicit use of 'London' as a form of branding has also deliberately been mobilised to give models a broader applicability, given the city's perceived global status.
The Learning Legacy Agenda has been looked at in detail in order to unpack the multiple rationalities of key agents in the social formation and circulation of this model. The LLA is not the model itself, but the mechanism for capturing, distilling and pre-packaging 'what works', for transfer elsewhere. Central to the emergent governance narrative has been the proclamation by its propagators that success has occurred because the 'politics has been taken out' of the development process. The LLA provided a fit-for-purpose apparatus to vaunt this illusory feat and illustrate it through the modest (rather than boosterish) compilation of "stripped down best practices without need of a supporting discourse" (Interview ODA Planner). Indeed, the LLA was not a pre-planned or pre-determined activity, rather a bit of an ad hoc after-thought; a bureaucratic side-project. Its origins can be found in the initiative of specific individuals within the ODA but its take-up and appropriation extends to an extensive social network of high-profile development and governance actors and organisations, not merely participating, but more directly driving the agenda forward for a variety of selfvalidating purposes. This supports Peck and Theodore's (2010) observation of the topological nature of modern governance; that increasingly the centres of authority are not enshrined in government departments and agencies but the complex assemblage of firms, consultancies, agencies and organisations that constitute a decentralized governance field.
We have shown how the proclamation of any new model inherently obscures the complexities and tensions that prefigure its coherence into a one-dimensional off-the-shelf package of best practices. As such the 'embodied knowledge' (cf. Roy, 2012) of the ODA-led LLA constitutes a powerful governmental technology providing a programmatic template for dominant development interests to 'repeat the trick' of London 2012. The 'London model' as a label may not be embedded in popular lexis to the extent as say the 'Barcelona model' or the 'Vancouver model'. It is nonetheless iconic in its capacity to cohere a political alliance of stateled, business-led and sector-led interests around a powerful development project, the Olympic Games, and disguise it as a non-political success story of the power of unexceptional technical practice, capable of being repeated at various scales and in different international contexts. The representation of a London model is being used post hoc to connect-up a disparate set of policy interventions and programmes across the city and cohere them into a transferable narrative (see The Economist, 2012). Moreover, it signifies the extension of a broader political project that focuses on the re-tooling of governance arrangements into vehicles that facilitate the production of new built environments. The Olympic example has been used as a model to legitimate broader and far-reaching changes to the financing and practices of local government in England. There is now increasing emphasis placed on the pursuit of economic growth through local authorities prioritising development wherever possible. In line with countries such as the United States, there is also a greater reliance on the funding of local infrastructure and services through the 'gains' that can be captured from 'viable' development projects.
Whilst it would be too strong a claim to argue that the promotion of a London model led to such reforms, it is clear that it has played a strong political role in exemplifying what can be 'achieved' through the implementation of a growth-first governmental system. As we have shown, institutional vehicles for the promotion of the model, such as the LLA, have played a key role in this wider programme of knowledge circulation.
The paper has explored the ways in which the social relations of knowledge production operate and how specific intentionalities and managerial practices become incorporated into broader institutional projects and agendas, situated in specific political and economic projects and programmes of action. This paper sought to develop a mid-level theorisation of emergent governance narrative or model formation and circulation via a more 'conjunctural' (Peck, 2017) approach to understanding recent transformations in urban governance and development, "sceptical of both the universalism and the particularism" (Peck, 2017, p.10 ) of the intentionalities for mobility. In a context of increasing regulatory complexity surrounding urban projects and the emergence of powerful corporations that are increasingly able to deliver such projects on behalf of state bodies, the power and significance of governance models to influence the local politics of urban development in cities is likely to grow. Off-the-shelf 'good governance' models, premised on governmental techniques and arrangements that serve to protect technocratic experts from the political disruptions wrought by local agents, will become increasingly important as cities across the world use urban projects to meet broader political and economic objectives. UK Government, 2013; Elson, 2013 
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